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<Article>
<Journal>
				<PublisherName>دانشگاه رازی</PublisherName>
				<JournalTitle>مطالعات اقتصاد سیاسی بین الملل</JournalTitle>
				<Issn>2383-3602</Issn>
				<Volume>9</Volume>
				<Issue>1</Issue>
				<PubDate PubStatus="epublish">
					<Year>2026</Year>
					<Month>05</Month>
					<Day>22</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</Journal>
<ArticleTitle>The Role of Artificial Intelligence in the Transformations of the International Economy</ArticleTitle>
<VernacularTitle>نقش هوش مصنوعی در تغییرات اقتصاد بین‌الملل</VernacularTitle>
			<FirstPage>1</FirstPage>
			<LastPage>24</LastPage>
			<ELocationID EIdType="pii">4219</ELocationID>
			
<ELocationID EIdType="doi">10.22126/ipes.2026.9995.1634</ELocationID>
			
			<Language>FA</Language>
<AuthorList>
<Author>
					<FirstName>تیرداد</FirstName>
					<LastName>تقی پور جاوی</LastName>
<Affiliation>دانش‌آموخته دکتری روابط بین‌الملل، دانشکده حقوق و علوم سیاسی دانشگاه علامه طباطبایی، تهران، ایران.</Affiliation>
<Identifier Source="ORCID">0000-0001-8959-4236</Identifier>

</Author>
<Author>
					<FirstName>حسین</FirstName>
					<LastName>سلیمی</LastName>
<Affiliation>استاد روابط بین‌الملل، دانشکده حقوق و علوم سیاسی، دانشگاه علامه طباطبایی، تهران، ایران.</Affiliation>
<Identifier Source="ORCID">0000-0002-9330-4606</Identifier>

</Author>
</AuthorList>
				<PublicationType>Journal Article</PublicationType>
			<History>
				<PubDate PubStatus="received">
					<Year>2023</Year>
					<Month>12</Month>
					<Day>13</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</History>
		<Abstract>Artificial Intelligence (AI) has evolved from an aspirational concept into a transformative technological paradigm that is reshaping global economic structures. This study investigates the multifaceted impacts of AI on international economic dynamics, emphasizing its influence on productivity, labor markets, trade systems, institutional governance, and the global distribution of power. Grounded in the Endogenous Growth Theory, the paper adopts an analytical-descriptive methodology based on extensive library and documentary research. The findings reveal that AI functions as both an enabler and a disruptor: it enhances efficiency and innovation while simultaneously generating new inequalities and institutional challenges. Specifically, AI drives structural shifts in five domains—international trade and development, institutional adaptation, productivity and efficiency, employment transformation, and power redistribution. Ultimately, the study concludes that AI is not merely a technological innovation but a systemic force capable of redefining economic interactions, governance frameworks, and competitive hierarchies at the global level.
Over the past decade, AI has emerged as one of the most influential determinants of global economic transformation. Its capacity for autonomous decision-making, predictive analysis, and large-scale automation has redefined how production, trade, and finance operate across borders. Scholars increasingly argue that AI represents the “engine of growth” in the 21st-century international economy, shaping not only business models but also geopolitical and institutional configurations.
This paper seeks to address a central question: How does the technological evolution of artificial intelligence alter the structure and dynamics of the international economy? By situating this question within the broader discourse on globalization and technological innovation, the study explores how AI-driven processes affect employment, trade flows, governance mechanisms, and power distribution among nations.

&lt;strong&gt; Theoretical Framework&lt;/strong&gt;

The study employs Paul Romer’s Endogenous Growth Theory (1990) as its conceptual foundation. Unlike exogenous growth models that attribute development to external inputs, this theory posits that innovation, knowledge, and human capital are internal engines of economic expansion. Within this framework, AI acts as an endogenous technological driver that accelerates innovation cycles, enhances labor productivity, and fosters knowledge diffusion.
By augmenting research and development (R&amp;D), AI strengthens human capital formation and creates increasing returns to scale, leading to sustainable economic growth. Moreover, AI’s analytical and computational capacities enable economies to internalize knowledge creation, making it a fundamental mechanism for continuous technological advancement and global competitiveness.

&lt;strong&gt; Methodology&lt;/strong&gt;

 This research adopts a qualitative, analytical-descriptive approach. Data were collected from a broad range of sources, including peer-reviewed journal articles, policy papers, institutional reports, and international databases. The analysis integrates comparative evaluation of global investment trends in AI, adoption rates across industries, and labor market shifts between 2013 and 2022. The study emphasizes conceptual interpretation and synthesis over statistical quantification, focusing on the causal relationships between AI diffusion and macroeconomic transformation in the global context.

&lt;strong&gt; Results &amp; Discussion&lt;/strong&gt;

&lt;strong&gt;4.1. AI and Global Trade Development&lt;/strong&gt;
AI optimizes logistics, supply chains, and customs management, reducing transaction costs and enhancing trade efficiency. Machine translation, predictive analytics, and algorithmic forecasting facilitate cross-border business and international market integration. However, the so-called “modern productivity paradox” suggests that the measurable macroeconomic benefits of AI adoption may lag behind its rapid technological diffusion. 4.2. Institutional and Governance Transformation: AI challenges traditional institutional frameworks and necessitates adaptive regulatory architectures. Emerging global initiatives—such as the European Union’s Artificial Intelligence Act (2021)—illustrate the need for ethical, transparent, and harmonized governance systems. The rise of “machine economies” also calls for redefined norms regarding data ownership, algorithmic accountability, and cross-border cooperation. 4.3. Redistribution of Economic Power: AI intensifies global economic competition by amplifying disparities between technologically advanced and lagging nations. The United States and China have emerged as dominant AI superpowers, leveraging technological leadership to extend their geopolitical influence. This dynamic fosters a new form of digital mercantilism, wherein technological capability becomes a determinant of economic sovereignty. 4.4. Productivity and Efficiency Gains: Empirical evidence indicates that AI adoption in manufacturing, logistics, and services leads to substantial cost reduction and performance improvement. Predictive maintenance, intelligent automation, and data-driven decision-making contribute to significant increases in productivity growth and operational scalability, potentially adding trillions of dollars to global GDP by 2030. 4.5. Employment and Labor Market Transformation: AI’s dual impact on labor markets involves both displacement and creation. Routine and repetitive jobs are increasingly automated, while new, high-skill occupations emerge in data analytics, algorithm design, and AI system management. The long-term employment effects depend on workers’ adaptability and the effectiveness of educational and reskilling programs supported by public policy.

&lt;strong&gt; Conclusions &amp; Suggestions&lt;/strong&gt;

 Artificial Intelligence represents a pivotal inflection point in the evolution of the international economy. It simultaneously enhances productivity and disrupts traditional market structures, redefining trade patterns, labor relations, and institutional governance. While AI-driven automation raises concerns about inequality and job displacement, it also generates unprecedented opportunities for innovation and sustainable growth. The study concludes that the future of the international economic order will depend on how effectively nations integrate AI into their development strategies while mitigating its socio-economic risks. Balanced governance, inclusive education policies, and cooperative international regulation are essential for ensuring that the benefits of AI-driven transformation are equitably distributed across the global economy.
&lt;strong&gt;Ethical Considerations&lt;/strong&gt;
Not applicable
&lt;strong&gt;Funding&lt;/strong&gt;
Not applicable
&lt;strong&gt;Conflict of interest&lt;/strong&gt;
The authors declare no conflict of interest</Abstract>
			<OtherAbstract Language="FA">هوش مصنوعی در دهه اخیر از یک مفهوم آرمانی به واقعیتی چشم‎گیر در زندگی بشر تبدیل شده است. با پیشرفت روزافزون این فناوری، هر روز شاهد دستاوردهای جدید و شگفت‌انگیزی در زمینه‌های مختلف هستیم. نفوذ و تأثیر هوش مصنوعی در ابعاد فردی، ملی و جهانی به حدی است که آگاهی و پیش‌بینی اثرات آن برای جوامع بشری ضروری شده و به ابزار مهمی برای رقابت تبدیل گردیده است. در سال‌های اخیر، تلاش‌های گسترده‌ای برای بهره‌برداری از توانمندی‌های هوش مصنوعی در حوزه‌های مختلف، به‌ویژه در اقتصاد، با نتایج برجسته‌ای همراه بوده است. این پیشرفت‌ها حساسیت‌هایی را درزمینه کاربرد هوش مصنوعی در حوزه اقتصادی ایجاد کرده و موجب رقابتی شدید میان کشورها در این زمینه شده است. هدف نوشتار پیش رو بررسی تأثیرات هوش مصنوعی بر تحولات اقتصاد جهانی است. این پژوهش به‎دنبال پاسخ به این پرسش است که تکامل فناوری هوش مصنوعی چگونه بر اقتصاد بین‌الملل تأثیر می‌گذارد؟ برای این منظور، از منابع مختلف شامل اسناد کتابخانه‌ای و اینترنتی استفاده شده و روش تحلیلی برای تدوین پژوهش به کار رفته است. نتایج نشان می‌دهد که در چهار حوزه اصلی ازجمله اشتغال و بیکاری، تجارت و توسعه بین‌المللی، الگوی توزیع قدرت اقتصادی و نهادها و رژیم‌های بین‌المللی هوش مصنوعی تأثیرات عمیقی گذاشته است که درنهایت به تحولات اساسی و تکاملی در این حوزه‌ها منجر شده است.</OtherAbstract>
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			<Param Name="value">اقتصاد بین‌الملل</Param>
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			<Param Name="value">تجارت</Param>
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			<Param Name="value">هوش مصنوعی</Param>
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			<Param Name="value">نهاد</Param>
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			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">اشتغال</Param>
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<ArchiveCopySource DocType="pdf">https://ipes.razi.ac.ir/article_4219_ec3fa5eca60e5eb5f9a504ef313488d4.pdf</ArchiveCopySource>
</Article>

<Article>
<Journal>
				<PublisherName>دانشگاه رازی</PublisherName>
				<JournalTitle>مطالعات اقتصاد سیاسی بین الملل</JournalTitle>
				<Issn>2383-3602</Issn>
				<Volume>9</Volume>
				<Issue>1</Issue>
				<PubDate PubStatus="epublish">
					<Year>2026</Year>
					<Month>05</Month>
					<Day>22</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</Journal>
<ArticleTitle>From Decline to Reconfiguration: Traditional and Emerging Challenges to U.S. Hegemony</ArticleTitle>
<VernacularTitle>از افول تا بازآرایی: چالش‏‌های سنتی و نوظهور هژمونی آمریکا</VernacularTitle>
			<FirstPage>25</FirstPage>
			<LastPage>44</LastPage>
			<ELocationID EIdType="pii">4307</ELocationID>
			
<ELocationID EIdType="doi">10.22126/ipes.2026.12779.1773</ELocationID>
			
			<Language>FA</Language>
<AuthorList>
<Author>
					<FirstName>حمید</FirstName>
					<LastName>احمدی نژاد</LastName>
<Affiliation>استادیار گروه علوم سیاسی و روابط بین‏ الملل، دانشکده ادبیات و علوم انسانی، دانشگاه لرستان، خرم‌آباد، ایران.</Affiliation>
<Identifier Source="ORCID">0000-0001-5859-0590</Identifier>

</Author>
<Author>
					<FirstName>حسین</FirstName>
					<LastName>چهره آزاد</LastName>
<Affiliation>دانش‏آموخته کارشناسی ارشد روابط بین ‏الملل، دانشکده حقوق و علوم سیاسی، دانشگاه خوارزمی، تهران، ایران.</Affiliation>

</Author>
</AuthorList>
				<PublicationType>Journal Article</PublicationType>
			<History>
				<PubDate PubStatus="received">
					<Year>2025</Year>
					<Month>09</Month>
					<Day>13</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</History>
		<Abstract>The hegemony of the United States, as the cornerstone of the post-Cold War international order, has rested upon economic-military superiority, international regime-building, and ideological authority. However, recent developments in the international system have revealed signs of erosion in this status. Drawing on Charles Doran’s power cycle theory and a descriptive-explanatory method based on library-based data, this study poses the following question: What traditional and emerging challenges does U.S. hegemony face, and how do these factors affect the transition of the international order? This study demonstrates that the convergence of relative economic decline, political-military challenges, and the weakening of ideological influence—as traditional factors—alongside novel challenges such as paramilitary actors, the erosion of ironclad deterrence, ineffectiveness against low-cost military technologies, and the decline of narrative-building, has accelerated the erosion of U.S. hegemony. This paves the way for the transition into a multipolar order in which China (in the economic arena), Russia (in the geopolitical domain), and middle powers (in asymmetric theaters of engagement) will play key roles as influential actors in shaping global politics.

&lt;strong&gt; Introduction&lt;/strong&gt;

Following the end of World War II, and especially after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States was recognized as the undisputed hegemon of the international order. The three pillars of this hegemony included economic-military superiority, regime-building capacity, and ideological legitimacy. However, regional and global developments—from the chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan to the Ukraine war and the intensifying rivalry with China—have shown that these pillars no longer possess their former robustness. In another dimension, emerging challenges such as paramilitary actors, the erosion of ironclad deterrence, low-cost military technologies, and ultimately the decline of narrative-building have, over the past two decades, subjected U.S. hegemony to multiple signs of erosion. By posing the question—what traditional and emerging challenges does U.S. hegemony face, and how do these factors affect the transition of the international order? —This article seeks to provide a comprehensive picture of the shifting balance and transformation of the international order.

&lt;strong&gt; Theoretical Framework&lt;/strong&gt;

The present study draws on Charles Doran’s power cycle theory—a framework that explains the rise, stabilization, decline, and replacement of hegemons as a cyclical process within the international system. According to this theory, hegemonic decline is not merely the result of the emergence of rivals but rather the consequence of internal erosion of legitimacy and ineffectiveness in reproducing order. This analytical framework helps to understand the current decline of the United States in conjunction with traditional and emerging challenges.

&lt;strong&gt; Method&lt;/strong&gt;

This research is analytical in nature and descriptive in methodology. Data collection follows a library-documentary approach, encompassing various sources including books, academic articles, official documents, and authoritative information databases. Furthermore, the collected data are supported by statistics and documented evidence to enhance the scientific credibility of the findings.

&lt;strong&gt; Findings and Discussion&lt;/strong&gt;

The findings indicate that the decline of the United States is multidimensional:

Traditional Indicators: Relative economic decline vis-à-vis China, political-military failures in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Ukraine, and the crisis of soft power and liberal legitimacy. These factors indicate that the United States can no longer impose the existing order solely based on the norms, values, and narratives of the liberal order.
Emerging Indicators: Inability to confront non-state actors (e.g., Houthis, Hamas, and Hezbollah), the erosion of ironclad deterrence against direct attacks on vital bases, the challenge posed by low-cost technologies such as drones and short-range missiles, and the decline of global narrative-building and consensus-shaping. These components are particularly evident in the Gaza war, the campaign against Iran, and failed sanctions against Russia.

     The combination of these traditional and new factors suggests that the United States has shifted from a &quot;dominant hegemon&quot; to a &quot;preeminent but constrained power.&quot; This transition simultaneously provides the groundwork for the enhanced agency of emerging powers such as China and Russia, as well as middle actors. From a theoretical perspective, this simultaneity of crises signals entry into the &quot;delegitimization&quot; stage of the power cycle—a stage that provides greater room for maneuver for emerging powers and reduces Washington&#039;s monopoly over setting the global agenda. Given the current trajectory, the future resembles not the persistence of unipolarity but rather a historical transition toward multipolar orders characterized by the dispersion of power centers and increased relative instability.

&lt;strong&gt; Conclusion&lt;/strong&gt;

This research concludes that the decline of U.S. hegemony is not a transient phenomenon but rather a sign of structural transformation in the international order. This decline does not mean the immediate collapse of U.S. power; the country still possesses extensive financial, technological, and military capacities. However, it will no longer be able to unilaterally determine global rules. Hence, the future of global politics will be shaped by multipolarism, great-power competition, and the increasing agency of middle and non-traditional actors. On this path, China (with economic power), Russia (with geopolitical influence), and middle powers (with asymmetric tactics) will have a greater share in setting the global agenda. The choice facing the United States lies between two options: either accommodate the reality of multipolarization and design a strategy based on cooperation and burden-sharing in security, or, by insisting on previous patterns, accelerate the erosion of its legitimacy and the entry into the fourth stage of the power cycle—namely, the creation of a new order</Abstract>
			<OtherAbstract Language="FA">هژمونی ایالات متحده، به‌عنوان ستون نظم جهانی پساجنگ سرد، بر پایه برتری اقتصادی-نظامی، رژیم‌سازی بین‌المللی و اقتدار ایدئولوژیک استوار بوده است. با این حال، تحولات اخیر نظام بین‌الملل، نشانه‌های فرسایش این جایگاه را آشکار ساخته‌اند. پژوهش حاضر، با بهره‌گیری از نظریه چرخه قدرت چارلز دوران و روش توصیفی-تبیینی مبتنی بر داده‌های کتابخانه‌ای، این پرسش را مطرح می‏کند که: هژمونی آمریکا در معرض چه چالش‏های سنتی و نوظهوری است و این عوامل چه تأثیری بر گذار نظم بین‏الملل دارند؟ نوشتار پیش رو نشان می‏دهد که پیوند افول نسبی اقتصادی، چالش‏های سیاسی-نظامی و تضعیف نفوذ ایدئولوژیک به‏منزله عوامل سنتی با چالش‏های جدیدی ازجمله بازیگران شبه‏نظامی، تضعیف بازدارندگی آهنین، ناکارآمدی در برابر فناوری‏های ارزان نظامی و افول روایت‏سازی، فرسایش هژمونی آمریکا را تسریع کرده است. این امر زمینه‏ساز تسهیل ورود به نظمی چندقطبی است که در آن، چین در عرصه اقتصادی، روسیه در حوزه ژئوپلیتیکی و قدرت‌های میانی در عرصه‏های بازی نامتقارن، به‏عنوان کنش‎گران تأثیرگذار نقش‌های کلیدی در شکل‌دهی به سیاست جهانی ایفا خواهند کرد.</OtherAbstract>
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			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">چرخه قدرت</Param>
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			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">هژمونی</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">ایالات متحده آمریکا</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">نظم جهانی</Param>
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			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">نظم جدید</Param>
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<ArchiveCopySource DocType="pdf">https://ipes.razi.ac.ir/article_4307_0c0e691c7e878b52d5ed5224a094ba60.pdf</ArchiveCopySource>
</Article>

<Article>
<Journal>
				<PublisherName>دانشگاه رازی</PublisherName>
				<JournalTitle>مطالعات اقتصاد سیاسی بین الملل</JournalTitle>
				<Issn>2383-3602</Issn>
				<Volume>9</Volume>
				<Issue>1</Issue>
				<PubDate PubStatus="epublish">
					<Year>2026</Year>
					<Month>05</Month>
					<Day>22</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</Journal>
<ArticleTitle>China's Belt and Road Initiative and the Critique of Debt Trap Diplomacy</ArticleTitle>
<VernacularTitle>ابتکارکمربند و راه و نقد ایده دیپلماسی تله بدهی چین</VernacularTitle>
			<FirstPage>45</FirstPage>
			<LastPage>63</LastPage>
			<ELocationID EIdType="pii">4292</ELocationID>
			
<ELocationID EIdType="doi">10.22126/ipes.2026.10887.1678</ELocationID>
			
			<Language>FA</Language>
<AuthorList>
<Author>
					<FirstName>سعید</FirstName>
					<LastName>میرترابی</LastName>
<Affiliation>دانشیار گروه روابط بین‌الملل دانشگاه خوارزمی، تهران، ایران.</Affiliation>
<Identifier Source="ORCID">0000-0003-3697-2672</Identifier>

</Author>
</AuthorList>
				<PublicationType>Journal Article</PublicationType>
			<History>
				<PubDate PubStatus="received">
					<Year>2024</Year>
					<Month>07</Month>
					<Day>19</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</History>
		<Abstract>More than a decade has passed since China launched its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), during which serious criticisms have emerged regarding the negative consequences of China&#039;s financial and infrastructure activities in host countries. One of the most significant and frequently mentioned critiques is framed within the concept of &quot;China’s debt trap diplomacy.&quot; This article aims to examine various aspects of China’s financing activities related to infrastructure projects under the BRI and to evaluate the validity of claims made regarding the &quot;debt trap&quot; accusation. The primary question of the article is, &quot;To what extent does the management of the Belt and Road Initiative and the financing methods used for projects in host countries corroborate the claim of a &#039;debt trap&#039;?&quot; The hypothesis tested in response to this is that &quot;the decentralized and sometimes contradictory nature of the management of the Belt and Road Initiative, along with the financing methods and the reactions of Chinese financial institutions to the debt crises of host countries, confirm the prioritization of Chinese interests in these joint projects but do not substantiate the idea of entrapment for the purpose of appropriating the host country&#039;s strategic assets.&quot; The findings of the article indicate that many analyses and evaluations regarding the revival of the Silk Road Initiative are influenced by the existing competitive atmosphere between China and the West in various international arenas. So a better understanding of the nature of China’s activities in this area requires distancing from polarized perspectives toward it.

&lt;strong&gt; Introduction&lt;/strong&gt;

Since the announcement of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2013, the initiative has become one of the most debated international economic and geopolitical projects of the twenty-first century. Alongside discussions concerning its role in infrastructure development and regional connectivity, serious criticisms have emerged regarding the financial and political consequences of Chinese lending activities in developing countries. Among these criticisms, the concept of “China’s debt trap diplomacy” has received significant attention in political, media, and academic debates, particularly in Western strategic discourse. According to this perspective, China intentionally provides large-scale loans to economically vulnerable countries through BRI projects in ways that create unsustainable debt burdens and eventually enable Beijing to gain strategic advantages when debtor states face repayment difficulties. The case of Sri Lanka’s Hambantota Port has frequently been presented as a key example supporting this claim. At the same time, an increasing number of scholars have challenged the analytical validity of the debt trap narrative and questioned whether debt crises in borrowing countries can genuinely be attributed to a deliberate Chinese geopolitical strategy. In this context, the present article examines the nature of China’s infrastructure financing under the BRI and evaluates the extent to which the debt trap diplomacy thesis corresponds with the actual patterns of Chinese lending, the debt structures of host countries, and the governance mechanisms of the initiative itself.

&lt;strong&gt; Theoretical Framework&lt;/strong&gt;

The theoretical framework of this article is based on two main analytical dimensions: the conceptual foundations of the debt trap diplomacy thesis and the governance structure of China’s Belt and Road Initiative. The debt trap argument assumes that China follows a centralized and intentional strategy aimed at creating unsustainable debt in order to obtain strategic assets or political influence in borrowing countries. However, drawing on recent studies of the Chinese party state, particularly the works of Lee Jones and Shahar Hameiri, the article argues that the governance structure of the BRI is fragmented and decentralized rather than fully centralized. Various actors, including state-owned enterprises, financial institutions, and local authorities, participate in BRI projects while pursuing both political and commercial interests. Consequently, many of the problems associated with BRI projects are better understood as the outcome of overlapping economic interests, bureaucratic competition, and weak governance conditions in host countries rather than evidence of a coherent Chinese strategy of deliberate debt entrapment.

&lt;strong&gt; Methodology&lt;/strong&gt;

This article employs a descriptive and explanatory research method to examine the validity of the debt trap diplomacy thesis in relation to China’s Belt and Road Initiative. The study is based on qualitative analysis of academic literature, policy reports, financial data, and documented experiences of several borrowing countries involved in BRI infrastructure projects. In order to test the main hypothesis, the article analyzes key elements associated with the debt trap argument, including the governance structure of the BRI, patterns of Chinese lending, the role of debt in financial crises of host countries, and China’s responses to cases of debt distress. Comparative examination of cases such as Sri Lanka, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ecuador, Kenya, and other developing countries is also used to evaluate whether Chinese financing practices support the claim of a deliberate strategy of debt entrapment.

&lt;strong&gt; Results and Discussion&lt;/strong&gt;

The findings of the article indicated that although a considerable number of BRI infrastructure projects have contributed to rising debt burdens and financial vulnerabilities in several host countries, the available evidence does not support the claim that China systematically and deliberately employs a strategy of debt trap diplomacy for the purpose of seizing strategic assets. The analysis demonstrates that debt crises in many borrowing countries are rooted in broader structural problems, including weak governance, corruption, poor economic planning, and excessive dependence on external borrowing from multiple international creditors rather than China alone. Cases frequently cited in support of the debt trap thesis, particularly Sri Lanka, reveal that Chinese loans represented only a portion of overall external debt and that the major sources of financial vulnerability often originated from international capital markets and domestic policy failures. At the same time, the study shows that Chinese state-owned enterprises and financial institutions frequently prioritize commercial interests and resource access in BRI projects, especially in countries with weak institutional capacity. Consequently, while Chinese financing practices may contribute to debt-related difficulties and reflect opportunistic economic behavior, the evidence does not confirm the existence of a coherent and centrally directed Chinese strategy designed to intentionally entrap countries in unsustainable debt.
Conclusion
     The article concludes that the debt trap diplomacy narrative oversimplifies the complex realities of China’s Belt and Road Initiative and is heavily influenced by the broader geopolitical rivalry between China and Western powers. Although Chinese infrastructure financing has, in some cases, intensified debt vulnerabilities and generated significant political and economic criticism, these outcomes cannot automatically be interpreted as evidence of a deliberate strategy aimed at appropriating strategic assets of borrowing states. The fragmented and decentralized nature of BRI governance, the diverse motivations of Chinese actors involved in overseas projects, and the important role of domestic governance failures in host countries all challenge the validity of the debt trap thesis in its strongest form. Nevertheless, the study also emphasizes that China’s overseas financing practices are not purely developmental or altruistic, since Chinese institutions often pursue commercial advantages and strategic economic interests through these projects. Therefore, a balanced and evidence-based understanding of the BRI requires moving beyond highly polarized interpretations and examining Chinese international economic activities within the broader context of global political and economic competition.
&lt;strong&gt;Ethical Considerations&lt;/strong&gt;
Not applicable
&lt;strong&gt;Funding&lt;/strong&gt;
Not applicable
&lt;strong&gt;Conflict of interest&lt;/strong&gt;
The authors declare no conflict of interest
 
 </Abstract>
			<OtherAbstract Language="FA">با گذشت بیش از ده سال از پیش‎برد ابتکار کمربند و راه چین، نقدهایی جدی درباره پیامدهای منفی فعالیت‌های مالی و زیرساختی چین در کشورهای میزبان مطرح شده است که یکی از مهم‌ترین و پرتکرارترین این نقدها، در چارچوب ایده «دیپلماسی دام بدهی چین» مطرح شده است. نوشتار پیش رو کوشیده است ضمن بررسی جنبه‌های مختلف فعالیت‌های تأمین مالی چین در پروژه‌های زیرساختی ذیل ابتکار کمربند و راه، صحت ادعاهای مطرح‌شده در قالب ادعای «تله بدهی» را مورد ارزیابی قرار دهد. پرسش اصلی پژوهش مبتنی بر روش توصیفی-تبیینی این است که «شیوه اداره ابتکار کمربند و روش‌های تأمین مالی پروژه‌های ذیل آن در کشورهای میزبان تا چه اندازه ادعای «تله بدهی» را تأیید می‌کند؟» فرضیه‌ای که در پاسخ مورد آزمون قرار گرفته این است که «ماهیت غیر متمرکز و گاه متناقض اداره ابتکار کمربند و راه به همراه روش تأمین مالی و واکنش مؤسسات مالی چین به موارد بحران بدهی کشور میزبان، اولویت داشتن منافع طرف چینی در این طرح‌های مشترک را تأیید می‌کند، اما نمی‌تواند ایده تله&lt;em&gt;‎&lt;/em&gt;گذاری برای دست‌اندازی به دارایی‌های راهبردی کشور میزبان را اثبات نماید». یافته پژوهش این است که بسیاری از تحلیل‌ها و ارزیابی‌ها درباره ابتکار احیای راه ابریشم متأثر از فضای رقابتی موجود میان غرب و ایالات متحده در عرصه‌های مختلف بین‌المللی است و درک بهتر ماهیت فعالیت‌های چین در این حوزه برای پایه‌ریزی بهتر منافع ملی، نیازمند فاصله گرفتن از نگاه‌های حب و بغض گونه نسبت به آن است.</OtherAbstract>
		<ObjectList>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">ابتکار کمربند و راه</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">تله بدهی</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">چین</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">کشورهای وام‌گیرنده</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">ارزیابی</Param>
			</Object>
		</ObjectList>
<ArchiveCopySource DocType="pdf">https://ipes.razi.ac.ir/article_4292_d3ea8e0f5d6789309d1dd229354c090c.pdf</ArchiveCopySource>
</Article>

<Article>
<Journal>
				<PublisherName>دانشگاه رازی</PublisherName>
				<JournalTitle>مطالعات اقتصاد سیاسی بین الملل</JournalTitle>
				<Issn>2383-3602</Issn>
				<Volume>9</Volume>
				<Issue>1</Issue>
				<PubDate PubStatus="epublish">
					<Year>2026</Year>
					<Month>05</Month>
					<Day>22</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</Journal>
<ArticleTitle>Egypt's Foreign Policy Shift from Nasser to Sadat: A Political Economy Perspective (1965–1981)</ArticleTitle>
<VernacularTitle>تحول در سیاست خارجی مصر در دوره گذار از عبدالناصر به سادات؛ تحلیلی از چشم انداز اقتصاد سیاسی (1965-1981 میلادی)</VernacularTitle>
			<FirstPage>65</FirstPage>
			<LastPage>82</LastPage>
			<ELocationID EIdType="pii">4242</ELocationID>
			
<ELocationID EIdType="doi">10.22126/ipes.2026.12719.1769</ELocationID>
			
			<Language>FA</Language>
<AuthorList>
<Author>
					<FirstName>سید امیر</FirstName>
					<LastName>نیاکویی</LastName>
<Affiliation>استاد گروه علوم سیاسی، دانشکده ادبیات و علوم انسانی، دانشگاه گیلان، رشت.</Affiliation>
<Identifier Source="ORCID">0000-0001-8865-8824</Identifier>

</Author>
<Author>
					<FirstName>حمید</FirstName>
					<LastName>سرادار</LastName>
<Affiliation>دانشجوی دکتری روابط بین‌الملل، دانشکده ادبیات و علوم انسانی، دانشگاه گیلان، رشت، ایران</Affiliation>
<Identifier Source="ORCID">0009-0007-0908-887X</Identifier>

</Author>
</AuthorList>
				<PublicationType>Journal Article</PublicationType>
			<History>
				<PubDate PubStatus="received">
					<Year>2025</Year>
					<Month>09</Month>
					<Day>07</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</History>
		<Abstract>Egypt&#039;s pivot from alignment with the Eastern Bloc to the establishment of strategic relations with the West, spanning from the late Nasser era to Sadat&#039;s ascendance to power, represents one of the most significant turning points in the country&#039;s contemporary foreign policy. This shift was neither episodic nor confined to a particular historical juncture; rather, it inaugurated a trajectory that has continued to shape the overarching framework of Egypt&#039;s foreign policy to the present day. The central question addressed in this article is how Egypt&#039;s fundamental foreign policy reorientation during the transitional period from Nasser to Sadat can be explained from a political economy perspective. The main hypothesis posits that the transformation of Egypt&#039;s foreign policy during the period under examination was shaped both by structural changes in the international political economy and by domestic political economy dynamics, including state ideology, the interactions between rival political actors, and shifts in the country&#039;s economic strategies and policy orientations. Accordingly, this transformation can be meaningfully analyzed within the theoretical framework of political economy. The article argues that the change in Egypt&#039;s foreign policy is best understood in conjunction with the evolution of its economic paradigm—from the state-led socialism characteristic of the early Nasser years to the open-door (Infitah) policies adopted in the subsequent period—as well as with broader transformations in the international political economy. Indeed, the termination of three decades of hostility with the Zionist regime and the strategic pivot toward the West were closely intertwined with Egypt&#039;s economic liberalization agenda. In the aftermath of this shift, the Egyptian economy became increasingly reliant on external revenues and assistance, tourism, and the expansion of foreign direct investment.

&lt;strong&gt; Introduction&lt;/strong&gt;

Egypt, as the most populous country in the Arab world and a central actor in Middle Eastern politics, has experienced significant transformations in its foreign policy during the second half of the twentieth century. One of the most critical turning points occurred during the transition from the presidency of Gamal Abdel Nasser to that of Anwar Sadat. During this period, Egypt gradually shifted its foreign policy orientation from alignment with the Eastern bloc, particularly the Soviet Union, toward strategic cooperation with the Western bloc, especially the United States. This transformation ultimately culminated in the Camp David Accords and the Egypt–Israel Peace Treaty of 1979. However, this shift was not merely the result of leadership change; rather, it emerged from deeper structural transformations in Egypt’s domestic political economy as well as changes in the international political economy.
Accordingly, this study seeks to explain the fundamental transformation in Egyptian foreign policy during the transitional period from Nasser to Sadat (1965–1981) through the lens of political economy. The main research question is: how can the major shift in Egypt’s foreign policy during this period be explained from a political economy perspective? The central hypothesis argues that the transformation of Egypt’s foreign policy was influenced by changes in both the international political economy and Egypt’s domestic political economy, including shifts in state ideology, the balance among competing political forces, and changes in economic policies and structures.

&lt;strong&gt; Theoretical Framework&lt;/strong&gt;

The theoretical framework of this research is based on the approach of International Political Economy (IPE). This perspective emphasizes the interaction between political and economic structures at both domestic and international levels and seeks to explain how economic forces shape political decisions, including foreign policy behavior. Within this framework, foreign policy outcomes are not viewed solely as the result of security considerations or ideological commitments but rather as the product of complex interactions among international economic structures, domestic political coalitions, state ideology, and economic interests. 
Political economy models of foreign policy assume that governments operate within the constraints and opportunities created by the global economic system while simultaneously responding to internal pressures from social groups, economic elites, and political institutions. Thus, shifts in foreign policy are often closely linked to transformations in development strategies, economic structures, and internal power distributions. In the Egyptian case, the transition from state-led Arab socialism under Nasser to a more market-oriented economic strategy under Sadat provides an important explanatory context for understanding the country’s changing foreign policy orientation. The study, therefore, examines how changes in international economic structures, domestic political dynamics, and economic policies interacted to shape Egypt’s foreign policy transformation during the period under study.

&lt;strong&gt; Method&lt;/strong&gt;

This research adopts a qualitative explanatory approach. The study employs causal analysis to examine the relationship between political economy factors and foreign policy transformation in Egypt between 1965 and 1981. Data were collected through documentary and library-based research methods, including books, academic articles, historical documents, policy reports, and statistical data related to Egypt’s economic and foreign policy developments.  The analysis focuses on several key variables: changes in the international political economy during the Cold War era, shifts in Egypt’s domestic political structure (including state ideology and elite competition), and transformations in the domestic economic structure. By examining these variables and their interaction, the study aims to provide a comprehensive explanation of the gradual shift in Egypt’s foreign policy during the transition from Nasser to Sadat.

&lt;strong&gt; Discussion &lt;/strong&gt;

The findings of the study indicate that the transformation of Egypt’s foreign policy during the period under investigation was the result of a complex interaction between international and domestic political economy factors. At the international level, the evolution of the global political economy during the Cold War, along with the growing influence of Western-led economic institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, created new incentives for developing countries to integrate into the global capitalist economy. For Egypt, improving relations with the United States and Western powers opened the possibility of receiving economic aid, foreign investment, and technological assistance. 
At the domestic level, several structural developments contributed to the shift in foreign policy. First, the state-led socialist economic model implemented during the Nasser era began to face serious challenges in the mid-1960s. Economic stagnation, rising military expenditures, declining revenues following the closure of the Suez Canal after the 1967 war, and increasing foreign debt placed significant pressure on the Egyptian economy. These economic difficulties weakened the viability of the existing development model and created incentives for economic reform.
Second, changes within the domestic political structure and elite coalitions played a crucial role. The transition of power following Nasser’s death intensified competition among different factions within the ruling elite. Under Sadat, a new coalition emerged that included technocrats, segments of the military establishment, and elements of the private sector. These groups favored economic liberalization, foreign investment, and greater integration with the global economy.
Third, there was a gradual shift in the ideological foundations of the state. Nasser’s foreign policy had been strongly influenced by Arab nationalism, anti-imperialism, and socialist development strategies. In contrast, Sadat adopted a more pragmatic and nationally oriented approach, emphasizing Egyptian national interests and economic modernization rather than broader pan-Arab ambitions. This ideological shift facilitated a reorientation of foreign policy toward the West.
The implementation of the “Infitah” (Open Door) economic policy in the mid-1970s was closely linked to these developments. Economic liberalization required access to Western capital, technology, and financial assistance. Consequently, Egypt’s leadership sought to normalize relations with the United States and reduce tensions with Israel. The 1973 war, while initially framed as a military confrontation, ultimately created diplomatic conditions that enabled Egypt to pursue negotiations leading to the Camp David Accords. Thus, economic reform and foreign policy realignment were mutually reinforcing processes.

&lt;strong&gt; Conclusion&lt;/strong&gt;

This study concludes that the fundamental shift in Egypt’s foreign policy during the transition from Nasser to Sadat cannot be adequately explained solely by the change of leadership. Rather, it resulted from broader structural transformations within Egypt’s domestic political economy and the evolving international political economy. Economic crises, the limitations of the state-led socialist development model, shifts in elite coalitions, and the need to attract foreign investment and technology all contributed to the reorientation of Egypt’s foreign policy.
     Furthermore, the research shows that the roots of this transformation can be traced back to the late Nasser era, particularly after the 1967 war, when the economic and political limitations of the existing model became increasingly evident. Sadat accelerated and institutionalized a process that had already begun during the final years of Nasser’s rule. Ultimately, the policy of economic liberalization and the reorientation of foreign policy were deeply interconnected. The normalization of relations with the United States and the peace treaty with Israel provided the international environment necessary for Egypt’s integration into the global economy and for the success of its economic reforms. In this sense, foreign policy during this period increasingly served the objectives of Egypt’s evolving economic strategy.
&lt;strong&gt;Ethical Considerations&lt;/strong&gt;
Not applicable
&lt;strong&gt;Funding&lt;/strong&gt;
Not applicable
&lt;strong&gt;Conflict of interest&lt;/strong&gt;
The authors declare no conflict of interest</Abstract>
			<OtherAbstract Language="FA">چرخش مصر از هم‌پیمانی با شرق به روابط استراتژیک با غرب از اواخر دوره عبدالناصر تا روی کار آمدن سادات، یکی از مهم‌ترین نقاط عطف سیاست خارجی این کشور در دوره معاصر به شمار می‌آید. این تحول، یک موضوع مقطعی یا محدود به دوره خاص نبود، بلکه شروع روندی بود که چارچوب سیاست خارجی مصر را تا دوره کنونی شکل می‌دهد. پرسش اصلی پژوهش حاضر این است که چگونه می‌توان چرخش اساسی سیاست خارجی مصر را در دوره گذار از عبدالناصر به سادات از منظر اقتصاد سیاسی تبیین کرد. فرضیه مطرح این است که تحول سیاست خارجی مصر در برهه زمانی مورد مطالعه، متأثر از تحول در اقتصاد سیاسی بین‌الملل از یک‌سو و همچنین اقتصاد سیاسی داخلی شامل ایدئولوژی دولت، مناسبات نیروهای رقیب سیاسی و تغییر رویکردها و سیاست‌های اقتصادی این کشور بوده؛ بنابراین در چارچوب نظریه‌های اقتصاد سیاسی قابل تبیین است. نوشتار پیش رو نشان می‌دهد که تحول در سیاست خارجی مصر در تعامل با دگردیسی رویکردهای اقتصادی این کشور از سوسیالیسم دوره ابتدای زمامداری عبدالناصر به سیاست‌های باز اقتصادی (انفتاح) در دوره پس از آن و همچنین تغییر در مؤلفه‌های اقتصاد سیاسی بین‌الملل قابل فهم است. درواقع، پایان دادن به سه دهه خصومت با رژیم صهیونیستی و چرخش به غرب، پیوند مستقیمی با برنامه‌های آزادسازی اقتصاد مصر داشت. از آن پس اقتصاد مصر بیش از پیش به درآمد و کمک خارجی، گردشگری و رشد سرمایه‌گذاری مستقیم خارجی وابسته شد. روش پژوهش به کار گرفته&lt;em&gt;‎&lt;/em&gt;شده در این مقاله کیفی از نوع تبیین علّی و روش گردآوری داده‌ها نیز به شیوه کتابخانه‌ای و اسنادی است.</OtherAbstract>
		<ObjectList>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">سیاست خارجی</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">مصر</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">اقتصاد سیاسی</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">عبدالناصر</Param>
			</Object>
			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">سادات</Param>
			</Object>
		</ObjectList>
<ArchiveCopySource DocType="pdf">https://ipes.razi.ac.ir/article_4242_3c291e88f9afc95500f335e783a75ce6.pdf</ArchiveCopySource>
</Article>

<Article>
<Journal>
				<PublisherName>دانشگاه رازی</PublisherName>
				<JournalTitle>مطالعات اقتصاد سیاسی بین الملل</JournalTitle>
				<Issn>2383-3602</Issn>
				<Volume>9</Volume>
				<Issue>1</Issue>
				<PubDate PubStatus="epublish">
					<Year>2026</Year>
					<Month>05</Month>
					<Day>22</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</Journal>
<ArticleTitle>The Political Economy of the Protest Crisis in Iraq: An Institutional Analysis from 2003 to 2025</ArticleTitle>
<VernacularTitle>اقتصاد سیاسی بحران و اعتراضات در عراق: تحلیلی نهادی از سال ۲۰۰۳ تا ۲۰۲۵</VernacularTitle>
			<FirstPage>85</FirstPage>
			<LastPage>103</LastPage>
			<ELocationID EIdType="pii">4306</ELocationID>
			
<ELocationID EIdType="doi">10.22126/ipes.2026.12726.1770</ELocationID>
			
			<Language>FA</Language>
<AuthorList>
<Author>
					<FirstName>روح اله</FirstName>
					<LastName>کهن هوش نژاد</LastName>
<Affiliation>استادیار گروه مطالعات غرب آسیا و آفریقا، دانشکده مطالعات جهان دانشگاه تهران، تهران، ایران</Affiliation>
<Identifier Source="ORCID">0000-0003-4871-6588</Identifier>

</Author>
</AuthorList>
				<PublicationType>Journal Article</PublicationType>
			<History>
				<PubDate PubStatus="received">
					<Year>2025</Year>
					<Month>09</Month>
					<Day>07</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</History>
		<Abstract>In post-Saddam Iraq, since 2009, the protest crisis has occurred regularly in Baghdad and most of the southern cities of Iraq, including the oil-rich city of Basra, reflecting the growing frustration of young people with public services, widespread corruption, and lack of job opportunities. However, since October 2019, the protests have intensified and witnessed significant changes in the demands of the protesters on the one hand and the government’s response on the other, expanding from mere material and livelihood demands to criticism of the political framework, especially elite quotas (al- Muhasasa). This article aims to examine the roots and economic context of these protest crises. The main question is how Iraq’s political and economic institutions, especially those established after 2003, contributed to the economic and social conditions that underpinned the crisis. The theoretical framework of economic analysis is based on new institutionalism, which is used to understand the economic and social contexts of the protests. The research is descriptive-analytical in nature and qualitative-quantitative in approach. The research findings show that the political institutions established after 2003 have hindered economic development in Iraq, and that increased political openness and inclusion have not led to greater economic inclusion. The way out of this situation is to move away from extractive institutions that benefit only a small segment of society, towards more equitable structures and improved governance through stronger rule of law and better quality public service delivery.

&lt;strong&gt;Introduction&lt;/strong&gt;

The political economy of the Iraqi protests from 2003 to 2025 is a complex interplay of institutional failures, political dynamics, and economic challenges that have significantly shaped the country’s development trajectory. This paper investigates the role of political and economic institutions in Iraq, particularly those established after 2003, in creating the socio-economic conditions that led to the widespread protests that began in 2019.
     The research explores how the post-2003 institutional landscape in Iraq, particularly the muhassasa (sectarian quota system), has created a deeply entrenched power structure that has hindered the development of inclusive political and economic institutions. The muhassasa system, which allocates political positions based on sectarian and ethnic identities, has entrenched the power of elite groups, leading to widespread corruption, inefficiency in governance, and a lack of accountability. This system has not only failed to promote economic development but has also exacerbated socio-economic inequalities, leading to public discontent and the emergence of large-scale protests.

&lt;strong&gt; Theoretical Framework&lt;/strong&gt;

The article is grounded in the New Institutional Economics (NIE) framework, drawing on the works of Douglass North, who emphasizes the role of institutions in shaping economic outcomes. It also incorporates the distinction between extractive and inclusive institutions as proposed by Acemoglu and Robinson, highlighting how extractive systems hinder development and perpetuate inequality. The study further integrates the concept of political settlements, as outlined by Khan, to analyze how power dynamics and historical shocks, such as the 2003 invasion and the rise of sectarianism, have shaped Iraq’s institutional landscape. The paper examines how the muhassasa (sectarian quota system) has entrenched elite power, leading to corruption and economic stagnation. By combining these theoretical perspectives, the article provides a comprehensive analysis of how institutional structures in Iraq have contributed to socio-economic crises and the rise of mass protests.

&lt;strong&gt; Method&lt;/strong&gt;

The paper analyzes the relationship between institutional structure and economic performance in Iraq, focusing on key indicators such as GDP growth, unemployment rates, and poverty levels. While Iraq has experienced significant GDP growth due to increased oil production, this growth has not been evenly distributed, and the economy remains heavily dependent on oil revenues, making it vulnerable to global market fluctuations. The lack of diversification and the persistence of extractive institutions have further constrained economic development and limited the benefits of oil wealth to a small elite group.

&lt;strong&gt; Findings &amp; discussion&lt;/strong&gt;

The 2019–2020 protests, which began as a response to economic grievances such as high unemployment, poor public services, and corruption, quickly evolved into a broader political movement demanding the end of the sectarian power structure and the establishment of a more transparent and accountable government. These protests, which were met with a harsh government crackdown, highlighted the deepening institutional failures and the inability of the current political system to address the needs of the population.
The study also examines the role of historical shocks—such as the 2003 invasion, the fall of Saddam Hussein, and the rise of ISIS—in shaping the political and economic landscape of Iraq. These events have not only destabilized the country but have also reinforced the power of elite groups, further entrenching the existing institutional structure.
     The article highlights the central role of political and economic institutions in shaping Iraq’s socio-economic crisis, particularly after 2003. It argues that the muhassasa (sectarian quota system) and extractive institutions have entrenched power among elite groups, leading to corruption, inefficiency, and economic stagnation. These structures have limited public access to resources, deepened inequalities, and fueled widespread discontent. The 2019–2020 protests reflect this systemic failure, as citizens demanded an end to sectarian governance and improved public services. The study shows that Iraq’s economy remains overly dependent on oil, with little diversification or inclusive growth. Institutional weaknesses, including poor governance and a lack of accountability, have hindered development and exacerbated poverty. The paper concludes that without major institutional reforms, Iraq will continue to face political instability, economic vulnerability, and social unrest. Reforms must address power imbalances, promote transparency, and create inclusive economic policies to ensure sustainable development and stability.
     Looking ahead, the paper assesses the potential for economic transformation and political reform in Iraq by 2035, emphasizing the need for institutional reforms to create a more inclusive and sustainable economic environment. It argues that without significant changes to the current political and economic structures, Iraq will continue to face instability, corruption, and underdevelopment. The paper concludes that the future of Iraq depends on its ability to reform its institutions, reduce corruption, and create a more equitable and inclusive system that addresses the needs of all its citizens.
&lt;strong&gt;Ethical Considerations&lt;/strong&gt;
Not applicable
&lt;strong&gt;Funding&lt;/strong&gt;
Not applicable
&lt;strong&gt;Conflict of interest&lt;/strong&gt;
The authors declare no conflict of interest</Abstract>
			<OtherAbstract Language="FA">در عراق پساصدام، از سال ۲۰۰۹، بحران اعتراضات به‌طور منظم در بغداد و بیشتر شهرهای جنوبی عراق، ازجمله شهر نفت‌خیز بصره رخ داده که نمودی از ناامیدی فزاینده جوانان از خدمات عمومی، فساد گسترده و فقدان فرصت‌های شغلی بوده است. با این حال، از اکتبر ۲۰۱۹ اعتراضات تشدید شده و شاهد تغییرات مهمی در خواسته‌های معترضان از یک‌سو و واکنش دولت از سوی دیگر بوده و از صرف خواسته‌های مادی و معیشتی به انتقاد از چارچوب سیاسی به‌ویژه سهمیه‌بندی نخبگان (المحاصصه) گسترش یافته است. هدف این مقاله بررسی ریشه‌ها و زمینه اقتصادی این بحران‌های اعتراضی است. پرسش اصلی این است که نهادهای سیاسی و اقتصادی عراق، به‌ویژه آن‌هایی که پس از سال ۲۰۰۳ تأسیس شده‌اند، چگونه در ایجاد شرایط اقتصادی و اجتماعی زمینه‌ساز بحران نقش داشته‌اند؟ چارچوب نظری تحلیل اقتصادی مبتنی بر نهادگرایی جدید با ترکیب دیدگاه‌های نورث، عجم اوغلو و خان است که از آن برای فهم زمینه‌های اقتصادی و اجتماعی اعتراضات استفاده می‌شود. پژوهش از نظر ماهیت، توصیفی-تحلیلی و از نظر رویکرد، کیفی-کمی است. یافته‌های پژوهش نشان می‌دهند که نهادهای سیاسی تأسیس‌شده پس از ۲۰۰۳ مانع توسعه اقتصادی در عراق شده‌ و افزایش گشایش و شمول سیاسی به شمول اقتصادی بیشتر منجر نشده است. راه برون‌رفت از این وضعیت، حرکت از نهادهای بهره‌کش که تنها به بخش کوچکی از جامعه سود می‌رسانند، به سمت ساختارهای عادلانه‌تر و بهبود حکمرانی از طریق حاکمیت قوی‌تر قانون و ارائه خدمات عمومی باکیفیت‌تر است.</OtherAbstract>
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			<Param Name="value">بحران</Param>
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<Article>
<Journal>
				<PublisherName>دانشگاه رازی</PublisherName>
				<JournalTitle>مطالعات اقتصاد سیاسی بین الملل</JournalTitle>
				<Issn>2383-3602</Issn>
				<Volume>9</Volume>
				<Issue>1</Issue>
				<PubDate PubStatus="epublish">
					<Year>2026</Year>
					<Month>05</Month>
					<Day>22</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</Journal>
<ArticleTitle>Assessing the Impacts of the U.S.-China Trade War on Iran: Political, Economic, and Cultural Aspects</ArticleTitle>
<VernacularTitle>بررسی تأثیرات جنگ تجاری آمریکا و چین بر ایران: ابعاد سیاسی، اقتصادی و فرهنگی</VernacularTitle>
			<FirstPage>105</FirstPage>
			<LastPage>124</LastPage>
			<ELocationID EIdType="pii">4308</ELocationID>
			
<ELocationID EIdType="doi">10.22126/ipes.2026.12132.1746</ELocationID>
			
			<Language>FA</Language>
<AuthorList>
<Author>
					<FirstName>رضا</FirstName>
					<LastName>ذبیحی</LastName>
<Affiliation>گروه مطالعات سیاستی ایران‎شناختی، بنیاد ایران‎شناسی، تهران، ایران.</Affiliation>
<Identifier Source="ORCID">0009-0005-8903-442X</Identifier>

</Author>
<Author>
					<FirstName>جواد</FirstName>
					<LastName>گلستانی</LastName>
<Affiliation>دانش‎آموخته روابط بین‌الملل، دانشگاه علامه طباطبایی، تهران، ایران.</Affiliation>
<Identifier Source="ORCID">0009-0004-9918-6091</Identifier>

</Author>
</AuthorList>
				<PublicationType>Journal Article</PublicationType>
			<History>
				<PubDate PubStatus="received">
					<Year>2025</Year>
					<Month>05</Month>
					<Day>05</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</History>
		<Abstract>One of the most important geoeconomic developments is the US–China trade war; this competition has not been purely economic and has political, technological, and cultural aspects. This research aims to analyze the political, economic, and cultural aspects of this war and its effects on Iran, 2018 - 2025. The main question of this research is to investigate the consequences of the geoeconomic situation, foreign relations, and economic structure of Iran. This study is based on a combined theoretical framework including geoeconomic realism, asymmetric interdependence, and modern mercantilism. The findings indicate that Iran has benefited from the gap between U.S-China to expand its interaction with the East by taking measures such as a 25- year agreement with China and joining in Shanghai. Iran has also increased exports to China with an oil discount, but due to the sanctions, it couldn’t take advantage of exchange opportunities in the supply chain and the American market, and in spite of concerns about technological dependence, digital cooperation with China has increased. In total, Iran’s foreign policy, considering the balance between East and West, should focus on the national interest based on strategic independence, sectoral diversity of partners, and strengthening domestic technological capabilities.

&lt;strong&gt; Introduction&lt;/strong&gt;

The trade war between the United States of America and the People’s Republic of China, which began in 2018 with the imposition of extensive trade tariffs, has gradually become one of the most significant geoeconomic trends in the international system over the past decade. This conflict has not been limited to tariff disputes; rather, it has expanded into areas such as foreign investment, advanced technologies, global supply chains, and even identity-based and cultural competition. The consequences of this trade war have affected not only the two main powers but also third countries, particularly developing states and those facing political–economic pressures, including Iran. Owing to its specific geopolitical position, an energy-dependent economic structure, and exposure to U.S. sanctions, Iran has been influenced by both the direct and indirect effects of this conflict. Within this context, the main question of the present study is what political, economic, and cultural–technological opportunities and threats the U.S.–China trade war has created for Iran, and how Iran can manage these developments in order to secure its national interests.

&lt;strong&gt; Theoretical Framework&lt;/strong&gt;

To conduct a multidimensional analysis of the impacts of the U.S.–China trade war on Iran, this study adopts a composite theoretical framework. First, geoeconomic realism, which emphasizes the linkage between power and economics, explains how states employ economic instruments such as tariffs, sanctions, technology controls, and investment policies to advance geopolitical objectives. From this perspective, the U.S.–China trade war constitutes part of hegemonic competition within a transitioning global order. Second, the theory of asymmetric interdependence provides a basis for analyzing unequal economic relationships, demonstrating that in conditions of interdependence, the actor that incurs higher costs from severing ties occupies a weaker position. This approach is particularly important for analyzing Iran–China relations under sanctions. Third, neo-mercantilism highlights the active role of the state in supporting domestic industries, industrial policy, and controlling foreign trade, and is useful for understanding China’s economic policies and the implications of Iran’s cooperation with a state-centered power. The combination of these three approaches enables a comprehensive analysis of Iran’s position within the geoeconomic competition of major powers.

&lt;strong&gt; Method&lt;/strong&gt;

Methodologically, this study is qualitative and descriptive–analytical in nature. Data have been collected through library and documentary research, including academic studies, international reports from institutions such as the World Bank, the World Trade Organization, and the International Monetary Fund, official trade statistics, and relevant domestic and international research. Data analysis has been conducted using an inferential approach within the integrated theoretical framework. The temporal scope of the study covers the period from 2018 to 2025, encompassing developments before and after the onset of the trade war, the administrations of Trump and Biden, and the renewed escalation of tensions in 2025.

&lt;strong&gt; Discussion and Findings&lt;/strong&gt;

The findings indicate that the U.S.–China trade war has generated multilayered impacts on Iran across three main dimensions. In the political dimension, Iran has sought to benefit from the strategic rift between Washington and Beijing by deepening its relations with China and other Asian powers. The signing of the 25-year Comprehensive Cooperation Agreement with China and Iran’s permanent membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization exemplify this approach and have contributed to strengthening Iran’s regional and international standing. Nevertheless, excessive concentration on a single eastern pole entails the risk of increased political dependency and reduced diversification in Iran’s foreign policy.In the economic dimension, although Iran’s exports to China have increased in recent years, this growth has largely relied on energy exports and raw materials sold under mandatory discounts. Due to sanctions, political uncertainty, and institutional constraints, Iran has been unable to exploit opportunities arising from the relocation of global supply chains and the attraction of foreign direct investment in the same way as countries such as Vietnam, India, and Mexico. Conversely, Iran’s dependence on imports of intermediate goods and industrial equipment from China has increased, which may weaken the country’s economic bargaining power in the long term. In the cultural and technological dimension, the expansion of scientific and academic interactions and the use of Chinese technologies and platforms in Iran are evident. While this trend may facilitate Iran’s short-term access to alternatives to Western technologies, in the long run, it raises concerns regarding technological dependency, cybersecurity, and the erosion of the country’s digital, cultural, and technological autonomy.

&lt;strong&gt; Conclusion&lt;/strong&gt;

The results of the study demonstrate that the U.S.–China trade war simultaneously presents Iran with multidimensional opportunities and threats. Iran has been able to take advantage of competition among major powers to strengthen relations with the East and reduce Western political pressures; however, due to structural and sanction-related constraints, its economic gains from this conflict have remained limited. Accordingly, the optimal strategy for Iran is neither unilateral reliance on the East nor a simple return to past patterns, but rather the adoption of a balanced policy that preserves strategic autonomy, diversifies economic partners, strengthens domestic technological capabilities, and actively participates in regional and global value chains. Only within such a framework can Iran define an active, flexible, and national interest–oriented position in the emerging economic order shaped by U.S.–China competition.
&lt;strong&gt;Ethical Considerations&lt;/strong&gt;
Not applicable
&lt;strong&gt;Funding&lt;/strong&gt;
Not applicable
&lt;strong&gt;Conflict of interest&lt;/strong&gt;
The authors declare no conflict of interest</Abstract>
			<OtherAbstract Language="FA">یکی از مهم‌ترین تحولات ژئواکونومیک دهه اخیر، جنگ تجاری امریکا-چین است که این رقابت تنها اقتصادی نبوده و ابعاد سیاسی، فناورانه و فرهنگی متعددی داشته است. هدف پژوهش، واکاوی ابعاد سیاسی، اقتصادی، فرهنگی جنگ مربوطه و بررسی تأثیرات آن بر ایران بین ۲۰۱۸-۲۰۲۵ است. پرسش اصلی پژوهش، به پیامدهای وارده بر موقعیت ژئواکونومیک، روابط خارجی و ساختار اقتصادی ایران می‌پردازد. این مطالعه با چارچوب نظری ترکیبی، شامل رئالیسم ژئواکونومیک، وابستگی متقابل نامتقارن، مرکانتیلیسم نوین، به روش توصیفی–تحلیلی انجام شده است. یافته‌ها نشان می‌دهند، در بعد سیاسی، ایران، با اقداماتی همچون امضای توافق‎نامه ۲۵ ساله با چین و عضویت در شانگهای، از شکاف میان آمریکا-چین برای گسترش تعامل با شرق بهره برده است. در بعد اقتصادی، ایران با تخفیف‌های نفتی به چین، صادرات خود را افزایش داده ولی به&lt;em&gt;‎&lt;/em&gt;دلیل تحریم‌ها نتوانسته از فرصت‌های جابه‎جایی زنجیره‌ تأمین و بازار آمریکا بهره گیرد. در بعد فناوری با وجود نگرانی از وابستگی فناورانه، همکاری‌های دیجیتال با چین افزایش یافته است. درمجموع، سیاست خارجی ایران با در نظر گرفتن توازن میان شرق-غرب، باید بر اساس منافع ملی مبتنی بر استقلال راهبردی، تنوع‌بخشی شرکا، تقویت توان فناورانه داخلی متمرکز باشد.</OtherAbstract>
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			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">آمریکا</Param>
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			<Object Type="keyword">
			<Param Name="value">چین</Param>
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			<Param Name="value">ژئواکونومیک</Param>
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<Article>
<Journal>
				<PublisherName>دانشگاه رازی</PublisherName>
				<JournalTitle>مطالعات اقتصاد سیاسی بین الملل</JournalTitle>
				<Issn>2383-3602</Issn>
				<Volume>9</Volume>
				<Issue>1</Issue>
				<PubDate PubStatus="epublish">
					<Year>2026</Year>
					<Month>05</Month>
					<Day>22</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</Journal>
<ArticleTitle>Representation of two Opposing and Interactive Models of Foreign Policy in Iran Based on the Distinction between Spirit-Based and Appetite-Based Societies: A Comparative Analysis of the Mossadegh and Rouhani eras</ArticleTitle>
<VernacularTitle>بازنمایی دو الگوی تقابلی و تعاملی سیاست خارجی ایران بر مبنای تمایز جوامع روح‌بنیان و اشتهابنیان: تحلیل مقایسه‌ای دوره‌های مصدق و روحانی</VernacularTitle>
			<FirstPage>125</FirstPage>
			<LastPage>140</LastPage>
			<ELocationID EIdType="pii">4272</ELocationID>
			
<ELocationID EIdType="doi">10.22126/ipes.2026.13681.1820</ELocationID>
			
			<Language>FA</Language>
<AuthorList>
<Author>
					<FirstName>حمید</FirstName>
					<LastName>یحیوی</LastName>
<Affiliation>استادیار گروه علوم سیاسی، دانشکده علوم اقتصادی و اجتماعی، دانشگاه بوعلی سینا، همدان، ایران.</Affiliation>
<Identifier Source="ORCID">0000-0002-5533-4222</Identifier>

</Author>
<Author>
					<FirstName>نجف</FirstName>
					<LastName>شیخ سرایی</LastName>
<Affiliation>استادیار گروه علوم سیاسی، دانشکده علوم اقتصادی و اجتماعی، دانشگاه بوعلی سینا، همدان، ایران.</Affiliation>
<Identifier Source="ORCID">0000-0002-0661-3268</Identifier>

</Author>
</AuthorList>
				<PublicationType>Journal Article</PublicationType>
			<History>
				<PubDate PubStatus="received">
					<Year>2026</Year>
					<Month>02</Month>
					<Day>27</Day>
				</PubDate>
			</History>
		<Abstract>This article offers a comparative analysis of Iran’s foreign policy during the administrations of Dr. Mohammad Mossadegh and Dr. Hassan Rouhani, based on the conceptual distinction between “spirit-based” and “appetite-based” societies. The theoretical framework draws on Platonic philosophical anthropology and contemporary reinterpretations of thymos in the thought of Hegel and Fukuyama. Within thi framework, when reason serves “spirit,” a pattern of behavior oriented toward dignity, recognition, and independence emerges; when reason serves “appetite,” political conduct becomes primarily directed toward material interests, welfare, and economic calculation. The central question of the article is why Mossadegh adopted a confrontational foreign policy toward external powers, whereas Rouhani pursued a strategy of engagement and cooperation. The main hypothesis argues that the predominance of spirit-based elements during Mossadegh’s era and appetite-based elements during Rouhani’s presidency led to the formation of two distinct foreign policy models. The findings indicate that during the oil nationalization movement, national dignity and political independence took precedence over economic considerations, resulting in a confrontational approach. In contrast, under Rouhani, resolving the nuclear crisis and lifting sanctions aimed at attracting foreign investment and improving domestic welfare became the primary objective, transforming foreign policy into an instrument of economic development. Using a descriptive-analytical method and relying on historical and documentary sources, the article concludes that the divergence between these two models stems from differing conceptions of human nature, national interest, and the relationship between dignity and welfare. At the same time, the experience of both periods suggests that the absence of a sustainable balance between spirit and appetite may generate structural challenges in foreign policy.

&lt;strong&gt; Introduction &lt;/strong&gt;

This article seeks to conduct a comparative analysis of Iran&#039;s foreign policy during the Dr. Mosaddegh and Dr. Hassan Rouhani administrations. The main research question is that Why did Mosaddegh pursue a policy of confrontation, whereas Rouhani chose the path of cooperation? The article&#039;s hypothesis is that during Mosaddegh&#039;s era, the reason of Iranian society served ‘the spirit’, leading him, as a representative of this society, to adopt a ‘spirit-based’ foreign policy. Conversely, during Rouhani&#039;s era, society&#039;s reason served ‘the appetites’, leading him, as a representative of such society, to pursue an ‘appetite-based’ foreign policy. In the nationalization of the oil industry movement, the element of dignity-seeking and independence-seeking prevailed over economic interests. However, in Rouhani&#039;s era, it was believed that cooperation between foreign capital and domestic labor could benefit the national economy.

&lt;strong&gt; Theoretical framework &lt;/strong&gt;

The theoretical framework of this article is based on the foundations of Platonic political philosophy and also reinterpretations of the concept of &quot;spirit&quot; in the thought of philosophers such as Hegel. In Plato&#039;s view, humans possess three main drives: appetite, reason, and thymos. If reason is placed in the service of the thymos, virtues such as courage, self-esteem, independence-seeking, and self-sacrifice are strengthened in society. Plato described thymos as a part of human desire that encompasses anger, shame, and the need for &quot;recognition.&quot; Hegel calls thymos the &quot;desire for recognition&quot; and considers it the source of history movement. Fukuyama, based on his own reading of Hegel, argues that the desire for recognition is a driving force behind many political and social transformations.
     When reason comes to serve appetite, material interests take precedence in individual and social motivations. Adam Smith published ‘The Wealth of Nations’ in 1776. The main message of ‘The Wealth of Nations’ is that there is coordination between the activities of profit-seeking individuals and the provision of public goods for the whole society.
     Considering the above, two types of society can be distinguished, which form the basis for two different behaviors in politics: First, a spirit-based society, in which humans strive to gain respect. Second, an appetite-based society, in which human behavior is based on achievement to material interests.

&lt;strong&gt; Method &lt;/strong&gt;

The methodology of this article is descriptive-analytical and, using historical sources and documents, seeks to comparatively analyze the intellectual foundations of Iran&#039;s foreign policy in two historical periods. Therefore, the article does not aim to adopt a prescriptive approach toward these two periods.

&lt;strong&gt; Discussion &lt;/strong&gt;

Mosaddegh, leader of the National Front, pursued a policy of oil nationalization. Initially, the National Front emphasized two advantages of oil nationalization: first, increased economic revenue; and second, preservation of political independence. However, the aspect of independence-seeking eventually prevailed over economic interests. Mosaddegh rejected international proposals to resolve the oil crisis due to their contradiction with the principle of nationalization. In his view, the activities of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company not only intensified the economic interest conflict between Iran and Britain but also constituted a form of national humiliation and damage to Iranian dignity. The oil nationalization movement can be considered the crystallization of a spirit-based approach in foreign policy.
     Hassan Rouhani directed his administration toward &quot;saving the country&#039;s economy, reviving ethics and constructive interaction with the world.&quot; Rouhani based his foreign policy on resolving the nuclear dispute and returning Iran to the global economy. The Rouhani administration believed that cooperation with global powers, especially Europe, could bring foreign capital back to Iran, accelerate economic growth, and reduce international tensions. Highlighting the country&#039;s young workforce, high rate of university education, abundant oil and gas resources, and industrial capacities, Rouhani presented Iran as an attractive location for investment. Rouhani&#039;s foreign policy was an attempt to connect foreign capital, natural resources, and domestic labor. The approach that aligns with the theoretical framework of &quot;appetite-based society.&quot;

&lt;strong&gt; Conclusion &lt;/strong&gt;

This article, relying on the theoretical framework distinguishing between spirit-based and appetite-based societies, conducted a comparative analysis of the foreign policies of two administrations: Mohammad Mosaddegh and Hassan Rouhani. Mosaddegh considered humans as &quot;dignity-seeking beings,&quot; whereas Rouhani assumed humans as &quot;welfare-seeking beings.&quot; These two perspectives created two different approaches to foreign policy: one based on recognition and dignity, the other based on interests and interaction. Although both approaches followed a specific logic in their historical context, the inability to create a balance between spirit and appetite in both periods led to serious challenges; In Mosaddegh&#039;s era, the dominance of spirit over appetite led to an economic crisis and in Rouhani&#039;s era, the dominance of appetite over spirit placed independence and bargaining power under pressure. Successful foreign policy depends on a sustainable balance between dignity-seeking and pragmatism</Abstract>
			<OtherAbstract Language="FA">این مقاله با تکیه بر تمایز مفهومی میان «جامعه روح‌بنیان» و «جامعه اشتهابنیان»، به تحلیل تطبیقی سیاست خارجی ایران در دو مقطع تاریخیِ دولت دکتر محمد مصدق و دولت دکتر حسن روحانی می‌پردازد. چارچوب نظری پژوهش بر انسان‌شناسی افلاطونی و بازخوانی معاصر مفهوم «تیموس» در اندیشه هگل و فوکویاما استوار است. بر این اساس، هرگاه عقل در خدمت «روح» قرار گیرد، الگوی رفتاری عزت‌طلب، استقلال‌خواه و مبتنی بر شناسایی شکل می‌گیرد؛ و هرگاه عقل در خدمت «اشتها» باشد، سیاست‌ورزی معطوف به منافع مادی، رفاه و محاسبه اقتصادی غلبه می‌یابد. پرسش اصلی مقاله آن است که چرا مصدق سیاست تقابل با قدرت‌های خارجی را برگزید، در حالی که روحانی راهبرد تعامل و همکاری را دنبال کرد؟ فرضیه پژوهش این است که غلبه مؤلفه‌های روح‌بنیان در دوره مصدق و اشتهابنیان در دوره روحانی، به تکوین دو الگوی متفاوت در سیاست خارجی انجامیده است. یافته‌ها نشان می‌دهد در نهضت ملی شدن صنعت نفت، کرامت ملی و استقلال سیاسی بر ملاحظات اقتصادی تقدم یافت و سیاست خارجی ماهیتی تقابلی پیدا کرد. در مقابل، در دوره روحانی، حل بحران هسته‌ای و رفع تحریم‌ها به‌منظور جذب سرمایه خارجی و بهبود معیشت عمومی در اولویت قرار گرفت و سیاست خارجی به ابزاری برای توسعه اقتصادی بدل شد. مقاله با روش توصیف تحلیلی و با بهره‌گیری از منابع تاریخی و اسنادی نتیجه می‌گیرد که تفاوت این دو الگو، ریشه در برداشت متفاوت از انسان، منافع ملی و نسبت عزت و رفاه دارد. در عین حال، تجربه هر دو دوره نشان می‌دهد فقدان توازن پایدار میان روح و اشتها می‌تواند به بروز چالش‌های ساختاری در سیاست خارجی بینجامد.</OtherAbstract>
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