The Effect of Election Cycles on the size of Government in Plitically Developed and Politically Developing Selected Countries

Document Type : Research

Authors

1 Professor of Economics, Department of Economics, Faculty of Social Science and Economics, Alzahra University, Tehran, Iran,

2 M.A of Change Management, Department of Management, E-Campus Branch, Islamic Azad University, Iran.

3 M.A of Economics, Department of Economics, Faculty of Management, Arak Branch, Islamic Azad University, Iran.

Abstract

This study, inspired by Peacock and Wiseman’s theory, attributes government size to political factors. The current study aims to analyze the effect of election cycles (election year, government ideology, Coalition and minority government) on government of size in selected developed and developing countries over the period (2002-2018). Statistical society includes twelve developing countries as a sample group and twelve developed countries as a control group. The research model has been estimated by using panel data and the generalized method of moments (GMM).The results showed that the election year and Coalition has had a positive and significant in both groups of selected countries on government of size. The minority government has had a negative and significant in both groups of selected countries on government of size. However, the effect of government's ideology index on government of size index in developed countries has had a positive and significant, while it was insignificant in developing countries. Furtheremore,, controlled variables, economic growth, openness of the economy, degree of urbanization and the index of misery on government of size were positive and significant. The effect of natural resource abundance on the size of government has been positive and significant in developing countries, while it was insignificant in developed countries.

Keywords

References

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International Political Economy Studies
Volume 4, Issue 1
September 2021
Pages 347-373

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History

  • Receive Date: 22 April 2020
  • Revise Date: 23 February 2021
  • Accept Date: 10 April 2021

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