The Impact of Techno-Nationalism on US-China Economic Competition (with an Emphasis on the Semiconductor Sector)

Document Type : Research

Authors

1 PhD student of International Relations, Faculty of Humanities, Tarbiat Modares University, Tehran, Iran.

2 Associate Professor of International Relations, Faculty of Humanities, Tarbiat Modares University, Tehran, Iran.

3 Assistant Professor of International Relations, Faculty of Humanities, Tarbiat Modares University, Tehran, Iran.

4 Associate Professor of International Relations, Faculty of Economics and Political Science, Shahid Beheshti University, Tehran, Iran.

10.22126/ipes.2023.9478.1596

Abstract

Techno-nationalism is a form of mercantilist thinking in the realm of new technologies that directly associates innovation and technological capabilities with a nation's identity, national security, economic prosperity, and social stability. This issue has become increasingly prominent since 2018 and the US-China trade war. One of the most significant symbols of this competition lies in advanced chips, or semiconductors. Given the significance of this topic, this research aims to address the fundamental question: "What impact will techno-nationalism, especially the technological battle in the realm of semiconductors, have on the economic rivalry between the United States and China?" In alignment with this research question, the hypothesis posits that "the technological contest in the domain of semiconductors, due to the acquisition of technological advantages, constitutes one of the most critical elements in the US-China trade war, and the economic supremacy of these two nations is intertwined with dominance in this sector." The results indicate that, given the importance of semiconductors in the production of a wide array of industrial products, their destiny-shaping role, and their position as a primary determinant in the economic competition between the United States and China, the West has maintained a substantial advantage over China so far. Nevertheless, China is pursuing various strategies to narrow this gap and reduce its reliance on the West.

Highlights

References

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  • Receive Date: 16 August 2023
  • Revise Date: 07 November 2023
  • Accept Date: 07 November 2023

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